This paper studies the significant variation in the cross-section of standalone and systemic risk of large banks during the recent financial crisis to identify bank specific factors that determine risk. We find that systemic risk grows with bank size and is inversely related to bank capital, and this effect exists above and beyond the effect of bank size and capital on standalone bank risk. Our results contribute to the ongoing debate on the merits of imposing systemic risk-based capital requirements on banks.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis has triggered a debate on bank size as a determinant of systemic risk.
There are a number of reasons why this debate takes place now. First, large banks were at the center of the recent crisis. Second, the size of large banks has increased substantially over the last two decades (Figure 1 ). Third, large banks tend to have lower capital ratios, less stable funding, and more exposure to potentially risky market-based activities (Figures 2-4 ).
This stylized evidence gives rise to a number of economic questions that are critical for formulating effective policy vis-à-vis large banks. First, what exactly is the source of risk in large banks? Is it low capital, unstable funding, market-based activities, size per se, or a combination of the above? Second, do these potential risk factors drive systemic risk through their effect on standalone bank risk (and can be addressed by traditional, micro-prudential regulation), or is there an effect on systemic risk that goes above and beyond that on standalone bank risk, suggesting a need for additional, macroprudential measures? Finally, which of the risk factors are robust across countries, so that targeting them could be part of international policy arrangements such as the Basel regulatory framework? Answering these equations is paramount for informing the policy debate. Without that, policy may be imprecise and lack consensus. Indeed, the views in the ongoing policy debate on large banks differ substantially. Some, including the Basel Committee, advocate capital-based measures -such as an additional surcharge of up to 2.5% capital on large banks (e.g., International Monetary Fund, 2010; and French et al., 2010) . Others, such as the Volcker Rule as contained in the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S., or the Vickers (2011) and Liikanen (2012) proposals in Europe, advocate restrictions on risky bank activities. And some advocate outright limits on the individual size of banks. Yet others argue that such restrictive regulations would distort the allocation of banks' resources, hurting the efficiency of capital allocation and imposing substantial costs to the real economy (Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson, 2010; Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek, 2013) . They propose to focus instead on reducing too big to fail subsidies through better resolution and contingent capital requirements (Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2010; and Stein, 2013) . This paper studies the significant variation in the cross-section of systemic risk of large banks during the recent financial crisis in a broad sample of countries, with a view to identify bank specific factors that determine systemic risk. We use the crisis as a shock to the banking system revealing the nature and size of systemic risk of individual banks. As proxies for systemic risk we use two recently developed measures of systemic risk, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2012) 's CoVaR and Brownlees and Engle (2012)'s SRISK. By simultaneously analyzing the role of banks size, capital, funding and activities, we are able to isolate the independent effects of these three key bank risk factors on systemic risk, and shed light on the ongoing debate on the merits of restricting bank size, imposing capital surcharges on large banks, and/or restricting their unstable funding and risky activities.
There are several theories supporting the view that large and complex banks contribute to systemic risk. According to one view, which we label the unstable banking hypothesis, large banks tend to engage more in risky activities (e.g., trading) and be financed more with short-term debt, which makes them more vulnerable to generalized liquidity shocks and market failures such as liquidity shortages and fire sales (Kashyap et al., 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2013; Boot and Ratnovski, 2012) .
According to another view, the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, regulators are reluctant to close or unwind large and complex banks, resulting in moral hazard behavior that leads banks to take on excessive risks in the expectation of government bailouts (e.g., Farhi and Tirole, 2012) .
According to a third view, the agency cost hypothesis, large and complex banks that engage in multiple activities (e.g., combining lending and trading) suffer from increased agency problems and poor corporate governance that can translate into systemic risk (e.g., Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2007) . According to this view, banks have a natural tendency to take on excessive risks and to grow in size, while regulators, by focusing on microprudential regulation, did little to prevent the resulting build-up of systemic risk. As a result, large banks tend to share many of the risk factors that other theories have identified as being important drivers of systemic risk, such as high leverage, activity diversity, and interconnectedness.
Our analysis is not an attempt to test these theories, which are not mutually exclusive, but simply to identify the main drivers of systemic risk more generally. In the process, however, we also learn something about the relative merits of these theories in explaining variation in systemic risk.
We find strong evidence that systemic risk increases with bank size. Our results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in total assets increases the bank's contribution to systemic risk by about one-third its standard deviation when measured by ∆CoVaR, and by about half its standard deviation when measured by SRISK. These are large effects. We also find evidence that systemic risk is lower in better-capitalized banks, with the effects particularly pronounced for large banks. The significance of these results is robust to the sample, to the metric of systemic risk used, and to a range of controlled for bank attributes.
Our analysis also highlights the importance of using measures of systemic risk rather than traditional measures of bank performance to assess the drivers of systemic risk. For example, using measures of standalone bank risk, such as stock return and equity volatility, would significantly underestimate the influence of bank size on systemic risk.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we analyze the determinants of systemic risk in a broad sample of countries, while the existing literature focuses primarily on the United
States. This allows us to establish results that are robust across country samples, and to control for country factors that may influence the relation between bank size and systemic risk, such as macroeconomic conditions and deposit insurance. Second, we consider alternative measures of systemic risk while the literature typically focuses on one measure of systemic risk. Because these measures capture different aspects of systemic risk, their correlation is not always high. In fact, Billio et al. (2012) and Giglio et al. (2013) show that a combination of systemic risk measures has more predictive power in explaining bank performance during crisis events than a single measure of systemic risk. Therefore to guide policy it is critically important to consider alternative measures of systemic risk. Third, we analyze the determinants of systemic risk controlling for standalone bank risk, thus linking our analysis most closely to the macroprudential policy debate.
Our paper is closely related to recent literature on measuring and explaining systemic risk in banks. For example, Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2013) relate ∆CoVaR to measures of a bank's reliance on non-interest income. However, unlike our paper, their sample is limited to US bank holding companies and they do not consider alternative measures of systemic risk. Beck and de Jonghe (2013) study how systemic risk is affected by lending concentration, Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) focus on the importance of interbank exposures as transmission channels for systemic risk, while Alessandri et al. (2014) link systemic risk to the Financial Stability Board's indicators of systemic importance. We focus on bank capital, funding, activities, and their interaction with bank size as the four most fundamental metrics that can drive bank risk.
Other papers study bank stability through proxies other than systemic risk measures. Berger and Bouwman (2013) find that better capitalized banks are more likely to survive banking crises. Hovakimian and Kane (1990) show that banks extract substantial safety net subsidies from the presence of deposit insurance, thus boosting their market values. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) , using crisis data, find that better capitalized banks performed better during the crisis, while Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that banks that rely to a larger extent on nondeposit funding and non-interest income are more profitable but also riskier.
Before turning to the analysis in this paper, a few caveats are in order. The measurement of systemic risk is still in its infancy (Hansen, 2012) . While we use the two most widely used measures of systemic risk, these measures will likely be refined and improved going forward while other measures are being developed. The measures of systemic risk are based on stock prices. In the presence of expectations of government support (bailouts), market prices may inaccurately reflect systemic risk. Moreover, these measures will not capture the full social costs associated with the failure of financial institutions, including output losses and unemployment.
While we focus on the interaction of bank size with risk, other studies analyze the interaction between banks size and performance. One strand of the literature focuses on the role of competition and economies of scale in banking. For example, Hughes and Mester (2013) find that banks enjoy substantial economies of scale. Another strand of the literature focuses on economies of scope at banks. Here, Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) find that diversified banks are better able to absorb liquidity shocks thanks to the presence of internal capital markets, while Laeven and Levine (2007) and Goetz et al. (2013) find that banks that diversify geographically or across product lines destroy value for their shareholders, consistent with the presence of agency costs in diversified firms. Other papers concentrate on the role of corporate governance, leverage, and regulation in influencing bank performance and risk. For example, using pre-crisis data, Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007) find that banks with large owners are more highly valued, while Saunders et al. (1990) and Laeven and Levine (2009) find that such banks also take more risks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data used in this paper. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
Data

Sample
To construct the sample, we start from all publicly traded financial institutions in Bankscope with data on equity returns and total assets at the end of 2006. We exclude financial institutions that are not publicly traded because our measures of systemic risk are based on equity returns.
We also exclude financial institutions that disappear before the end of our sample period in December 2008. This gives 1,721 financial institutions. For the most part, we exclude non-bank financial institutions and focus on deposit-taking institutions (i.e., commercial banks and bank holding companies), reducing the sample to 1,343 institutions. Our main analysis also focuses on large institutions that are more likely to be systemically important, limiting the sample to institutions with assets in excess of US$ 10 billion at the end of 2006. The resulting sample consists of 412 deposit-taking institutions from 56 countries. Table 1 reports the countries in our sample for which we have at least one large bank and for which we have country-level data on macroeconomic and bank regulatory variables (to be defined later). There are 32 countries in our sample that meet these criteria. There is much variation in the presence of large banks. A number of countries have only one large bank while 7 economies have more than five large banks (i.e., Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and United States). The United States is the country in our sample with the largest number of large banks of 28 in total.
Bank-level systemic risk
Our main focus is on systemic risk from the middle of 2007 to the end of 2008, which we refer to as the crisis period. This is the period during which share prices of major U.S. financials European governments took extraordinary measures to support their financial systems, including through nationalizations and government recapitalizations of financial institutions. Our sample period also coincides with the crisis period considered in Beltratti and Stulz (2012) , which simplifies comparison between the two studies.
Our systemic risk variables are ∆CoVaR and SRISK. The measure of ∆CoVaR follows Adrian and Brunnermeier (2012) . It corresponds to the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the market return conditional on some tail event observed for firmi :
where , m t r is the value-weighted return of the portfolio of all financial firms in the country we refer to it as the "market" portfolio,
C r is the event observed for firm i , and  is the quantile of the conditional probability distribution. CoVaR  of firm i is defined as the difference between the VaR of the financial system conditional on firm i being in distress and the VaR of the system conditional on firm i being in its median state. That is, , , 
C r refers to the case when the individual firm stock return is at its medium level. In order to capture the variation in ∆CoVaR over time, we also control for a set of global state variables, as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2012) . These state variables include: the VIX index of stock market volatility, the change in the three-month Treasury bill rate, the liquidity spread between the three-month repo rate and the three-month T-bill rate, the change in the slope of the yield curve, and the change in the credit spread between BAA-rated bonds and the Treasury rate. In our analysis, we take the negative value of CoVaR  to translate it into an increasing measure of systemic risk.
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2012) , we estimate ∆CoVaR using quantile regressions and using weekly data that covers both the pre-crisis and crisis period. Specifically, we estimate ∆CoVaR using weekly data from January 2000 to December 2012. Then in the analysis, we use the average of the predicted CoVaR for the period July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008 as our dependent variable for ∆CoVaR during the crisis period.
We compute ∆CoVaR using weekly stock returns denominated in local currency to abstract from exchange rate effects. The rationale for using the local rather than the global market portfolio for the measure of the system VaR is that the primary effect of systemic risk is local since the financial firms have to be supported and bailed out by national governments. As an alternative, we computed a version of global ∆CoVaR where we set the market equal to the global portfolio of financial firms, thus incorporating global spillovers. The two versions of ∆CoVaR are highly correlated, with a correlation of 58 percent that is significant at the 1% level, and the results obtained with either measure are qualitatively similar once we include country fixed effects. We therefore report only results using the local ∆CoVaR.
The second measure of systemic risk is SRISK, based on Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) . The SRISK index measures the expected capital shortage faced by a financial firm during a period of system distress when the market declines substantially. More precisely, , ,
(1 ) (1 ( ))
where k is the minimum fraction of capital as a ratio of total assets that each firm needs to hold (we set k equal to the prudential capital ratio of 8 percent), and , 
One-day MES is defined as the tail expectation of the firm's equity return conditional on a market decline: 
Bank characteristics
To identify the main drivers of systemic risk, we use several bank-specific variables, which proxy for the key risk factors highlighted in the earlier discussion: bank size, capital ratio, funding structure, and activities. Information on bank characteristics is obtained from Bankscope, and measured as of December 2006, i.e. prior to the crisis period (unless otherwise indicated).
Bank size is measured as the natural logarithm of the value of total assets in US dollars.
Capital ratio is measured using Tier 1 ratio, which is the ratio of tier-1 capital to total riskweighted assets. On the funding side, we examine the bank's reliance on deposit funding, captured as the ratio of deposits to assets. For bank activities, we use the ratio of loans to total assets to capture the bank's involvement in market-based activities.
In the extension of our analysis, we also control for country-specific variables: the presence of deposit insurance which previous research has shown can generate moral hazard on the part of banks using a dummy variable which equals 1 in countries that have explicit deposit insurance arrangements, and zero otherwise, using data from Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven (2005) , and GDP per capita. variables. We find that CoVaR  ranges from a low of 0.08% to a low of 9.77%, and SRISK ranges from a low of US$ -9.07 billion to a high of US$ 69.43 billion. The difference in the number of observations between the two measures of systemic risk is due to missing information on balance sheet information for some financial firms. Moreover, the correlation between the two measures of systemic risk and returns and volatility is significant but low, especially in the case of SRISK, suggesting that systemic risk cannot simply be attributed to negative returns and high volatility, which have been the focus of most earlier studies of bank performance during the crisis (e.g. Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) . 
Summary statistics
Standalone bank risk
We first examine standalone bank risk as measured by stock returns. Table 5 reports regressions for the determinants of equity returns, which have been the key proxy of standalone bank risk during the crisis in earlier studies. In Column 1, we find that the stock return is significantly lower for banks with larger size. In Column 2, the stock return is higher for banks with larger Tier 1 ratio. In Column 3, the interaction term of bank size and Tier 1 ratio is positive and significant at the 10% level. Therefore, higher capital ratio increases stock return, especially for large banks. In Column 4, we further include other bank characteristics such as deposit/asset and loan/asset ratios. We find that higher deposit ratio and lower loan/asset ratios are associated with higher stock returns. The interaction term of bank size and Tier 1 ratio is still positive, although not significantly different from zero.
The results offer a number of useful implications. First, bank size per se is a risk factor:
larger banks performed worse during the crisis. Second, large banks with low capital performed especially poorly, highlighting that low capital in large banks is a major concern. (Here, the concern is micro-prudential, because we focus on the determinants of standalone bank risk.) The result that depository funding improves bank performance is consistent with the earlier literature highlighting bank wholesale funding as a major source of vulnerability Ratnovski, 2009, 2011) . The finding that banks with more loans performed worse can be explained by some smaller US banks holding large volumes of mortgages (that later became distressed) on balance sheet. Table 6 examines the determinants of ∆CoVaR, one of our measures of systemic risk.
Systemic risk as measured by ∆CoVaR
Column 1 focuses on bank size. We find that bank size is strongly associated with ∆CoVaR. The economic effect is substantial. Based on the coefficient estimates for the ∆CoVaR regressions, a one standard deviation increase in the log of total assets, which amounts to an increase in total assets of US$ 3.9 billion, would imply an increase in ∆CoVaR of 0.67 or 0.34 times its standard deviation, which is a substantial effect.
In Column 2 we consider the influence of bank capital, as measured by Tier 1 ratio. We find that systemic risk is significantly lower for well-capitalized banks, consistent with the hypothesis that banks with more capital find it more costly to take on risk, and have larger buffers that reduce the probability of bank failure and the implications of bank distress. In
Column 3, we include the interaction term of bank size and Tier 1 ratio. There, the interaction term is negative, significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This means that higher capital ratio is particularly important for lowering the systemic risk for large banks.
In Column 4, we control for bank funding structure and activities, and find them not to be significant in explaining ∆CoVaR. However, the interaction of capital ratio and bank asset remains significant, both economically and statistically.
In the previous section we already pointed to the low correlation between standalone (as measured by stock returns) and systemic risk measures, suggesting that systemic risk cannot be captured simply through standalone bank risk, which has been the focus of most earlier studies of bank performance. In Column 5, we report regressions of systemic risk that control for the contemporaneous effect of equity returns and volatility, thus abstracting from the effects of banks size on systemic risk that operate through standalone bank risk. We find that bank size interacted with Tier 1 ratio remains significantly negative, suggesting that bank size contributes to systemic risk over and above its effect on the return level and its volatility. This also highlights the importance of using measures of systemic risk rather than traditional measures of bank performance in an analysis of the drivers of systemic risk. Using measures of individual bank risk, such as equity returns or volatility, would underestimate of the influence of bank size and capital on systemic risk.
Systemic risk as measured by SRISK
In Table 7 , we repeat the same regressions for the SRISK measure of systemic risk.
Column 1 focuses on bank size in December 2006, controlling for lagged values of SRISK. We find that bank size is strongly associated also with SRISK. In Column 2 we consider the influence of bank capital, as measured by Tier 1 ratio. Again, we find that SRISK is significantly lower for well-capitalized banks. In Column 3, we include the interaction term of bank size and Tier 1 ratio. There, the interaction term is negative, significantly different from zero at the 5% level. All these results are similar to those that were presented in Table 6 for∆CoVaR.
In Column 4, we control for deposit over total assets and loan assets in total assets. We find that SRISK is not significantly associated with deposit/asset ratio, but negatively associated with loan/asset ratio. In Column 5, we report regressions of systemic risk that control for standalone bank risk measure such as equity returns and volatility. We find that none of them are significantly associated with SRISK. The interaction of capital ratio and bank asset remains significant at the 5% level throughout.
Discussion of results
Our results offer a number of interesting implications. The interaction between bank size and capital appears the single most robust variable in explaining systemic risk. A caveat is that, in principle, the SRISK measure of systemic risk would respond to higher bank size and lower bank capital by construction. However the fact that the interaction is also significant for ∆CoVaR (and also for bank returns) suggests that it captures more than a mechanical relationship. This result is consistent with the view that large banks enjoy too big to fail subsidies, making them pay less attention to the risks they take, and that they create externalities when they are distressed. The effects of the interaction between bank capital and size are consistent with the "skin-in-thegame" incentives (i.e., the risk reducing effect of increasing the investment at stake for equityholders that only share in the upside) and loss absorption role of bank capital (i.e., more capital allows banks to better absorb unexpected losses).
We find that the interaction between bank size and capital influences systemic risk over and above the effect that it has on standalone bank risk. This offers a clear justification for macroprudential policy. Traditional micro-prudential regulation would not give sufficient attention to low capital in large banks, because it would neglect the implications that it has for the risk in the financial system as a whole beyond its effect on individual banks.
The fact that insufficient bank capital is more significant than bank funding or activities in explaining systemic risk validates the Basel approach of addressing systemic risk of large banks through capital surcharges rather than trough systemic liquidity tools or activity restrictions.
(Note that liquidity regulation would still be appropriate for micro-prudential purposes, as suggested by the results in Table 5 on standalone bank risk.) Our framework also suggests a way to estimate capital surcharges on large banks, which could compensate for the effect of their size on systemic risk. For example, the regression in Table 7 column 5 suggests that a capital surcharge of 2.5 percent reduces the excess systemic risk of a large bank with US$ 1 trillion in assets over an otherwise similar bank with US$100 billion in assets by a quarter, a substantial amount.
With regards to market-based bank activities, which generate non-interest income, and which have been the focus of regulatory initiatives in U.S., UK and Europe, we find that they affect the SRISK measure of systemic risk but not the ∆CoVaR measure. This can be interpreted based on the differences between the two measures. Note that ∆CoVaR captures financial system performance conditional on a realization in the left tail of the distribution of bank returns, while SRISK captures bank performance conditional on the left tail of system returns. Thus, ∆CoVaR can be seen as a measure more closely capturing contagion risks, while SRISK as more closely capturing the exposure to common shocks that affect the whole financial system. It would then appear that market-based activities make banks more exposed to common shocks (consistent with that market-based exposures are relatively more correlated across banks than, say, lending exposures), but are not material in increasing the risk of contagion from a distressed bank.
Systemic risk, bank characteristics, and country characteristics
So far we have used country fixed effects to control for country factors that could potentially correlates with systemic risk. Now we focus on a country trait which has entered the debate on financial structure, i.e., the presence of deposit insurance. We focus on the influence of deposit insurance, with a view that the pre-existence of a deposit insurance scheme captures the implicit support of the government to support large banks. Theoretically, the impact of deposit insurance could go either ways. On the one hand, one may expect deposit insurance to reduce the probability of bank run and hence systemic risk. On the other hand, one may expect the presence of deposit insurance, by inducing moral hazard when underpriced, to increase system risk. We also control for GDP per capita interacted as a proxy for the government's ability to support the financial system when it is in distress. To examine which effects dominate for large banks, we include an interaction of deposit insurance dummy in 2006 and GDP per capital with log bank assets.
The results are shown in Table 8 . Column 1 reports the regression for ∆CoVaR, Column 2 for SRISK, and Column 3 for stock return. We find that deposit insurance and higher GDP per capital interacted with log assets are significantly positive for SRISK, but not for ∆CoVaR.
Recalling that ∆CoVaR captures more scope for contagion while SRISK exposure to common shocks, the results appear consistent with the theoretical arguments that when banks expect to be bailed out in a crisis they choose to take more correlated risk (Farhi and Tirole, 2012) , increasing SRISK, but that at the same time the prospect of government support to banks reduces the risk of contagion (Dell'Ariccia and Ratnovski, 2013), mitigating the effect on ∆CoVaR.
In Table 9 , we look at the banks in OECD countries only and find similar results. That is, the interaction of size and capital ratio is significantly negative for ∆CoVaR and SRISK, while significantly positive for stock returns.
We also re-estimate our main regressions in Tables 5 to 9 for a longer sample period, the period July 2007 until December 2009. The rationale for doing this is that systemic risk in many European countries became elevated only in 2009 when sovereign risk pressures were coming to the fore in the periphery countries of Europe. Our explanatory variables remain computed for the end of 2006. We continue to find that the interaction of Tier 1 ratio and log assets is significantly negative for ∆CoVaR and SRISK, albeit insignificant (still positive) for stock returns. Therefore, our earlier results carry over to the longer sample period.
Conclusions
We find strong evidence that systemic risk increases with bank size. Our results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in total assets increases the bank's contribution to systemic risk by about one-third its standard deviation when measured by ∆CoVaR, and by about half its standard deviation when measured by SRISK. These are large effects. These effects might moreover underestimate the true systemic risk of large banks, because market values of bank equity during the crisis may be boosted by expectations of government support, and because they do not account for the social costs associated with large bank failures (e.g., output losses and unemployment). We also find some evidence that systemic risk is lower in more-capitalized banks, with the effects particularly more pronounced for large banks. The significance of these results is robust to the sample, to the metric of systemic risk used, and to a range of controlled bank attributes.
Taken at face value, these results lend support to the views that large banks pose excessive systemic risk, and could be seen as evidence in support of calls to limit the size or activities of banks. However, such calls should come with much caution because our empirical tests do not identify the optimal size of banks. In particular, while large banks may increase systemic risk, they may also offer efficiency gains, for instance by being better able to offer certain financial services that require economies of scale. Indeed, many would argue that the increased competition in banking following deregulation has increased the efficiency of banks.
The balance between these two considerations is a complex trade off.
Finally, and most importantly, even if we could conclude that large banks are excessively large it is not clear what to do about it. Quantity restrictions such as size and activity limits may be distortive if they are not set at optimal levels, which seems hard to do in practice, and may be easy to circumvent by large, complex banking organizations that are generally active internationally. For these reasons, some have argued in favor of tightening capital requirements, which can be seen as less intrusive and could easily be varied over time should this be deemed desirable (e.g. Stein 2013 ). And there is scope to reduce too-big-to-fail subsidies though better resolution rules, although it is doubtful whether these subsidies can ever be fully eliminated.
While our results underpin the importance of the debate on whether banks are too large and complex, more research is needed to guide policy in this important policy area. 
